

# Grøst1 Addendum

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## 1 Introduction

This document is an addendum to the submission document of **Grøst1**, which was selected for the second round of NIST’s SHA-3 competition [18]. We stress that we do **not** change the specification of **Grøst1**. In other words, **Grøst1** is defined exactly as specified in the original submission document [8]. In this document we mention a few *alternative* descriptions of our SHA-3 candidate **Grøst1** and describe recent analysis results on **Grøst1**.

We briefly recall that the **Grøst1** compression function is based on two large and distinct  $\ell$ -bit permutations  $P$  and  $Q$  (where  $\ell \geq 2n$ ,  $n$  being the output size of the hash function), and is defined as  $f(h, m) = P(h \oplus m) \oplus Q(m) \oplus h$ , where  $h$  is the chaining value and  $m$  is the message block. The permutations  $P$  and  $Q$  are built using the wide trail design strategy. A Merkle-Damg ard iteration [6, 17] of the compression function is applied, and it is followed by an output transformation defined as  $\omega(x) = \text{trunc}_n(P(x) \oplus x)$ , where  $\text{trunc}_n$  indicates truncation to  $n$  bits. When  $n \leq 256$ , we have  $\ell = 512$ , and when  $n > 256$  we have  $\ell = 1024$ .

## 2 Analysis results

In this section, we describe the current state of the art with respect to the analysis of **Grøst1**.

### 2.1 Rebound attacks

Recently, a new attack method for the cryptanalysis of hash functions has been proposed: the rebound attack [16]. It gives the best known results for a number of AES-based hash functions [12], including many SHA-3 candidates [13–15, 21]. In general, the rebound attack works with any differential or truncated differential. However, the diffusion properties of AES based hash functions allow a very simple construction of good truncated differential paths, which facilitates the analysis.

The rebound attack is most successful if a high number of degrees of freedom is available. Therefore, attacks on hash functions with a key schedule to the underlying block cipher or other sources of freedom are more likely to succeed (see the recent attacks on Whirlpool [12] or LANE [13]). However, **Grøst1** has been designed to limit the degrees of freedom available to an attacker. Moreover, in attacks on the *hash* function, much fewer degrees of freedom are available (compared to an attack on the compression function). As shown in Table 1, the best attacks on the hash function for **Grøst1-256** and **Grøst1-512** are for 4 and 5 rounds (out of 10 and 14), respectively.

On the other hand, in Table 2 we show recent results for the **Grøst1** compression function. The best (collision) attack on the compression function is for 7 rounds of **Grøst1-256** and **Grøst1-512**. An extension of these attacks to more rounds seems unlikely, since the remaining degrees of freedom in the attacks are close to zero. Therefore, **Grøst1** still enjoys a comfortable security margin.

Table 1: Summary of rebound analysis for the round-reduced **Grøstl** hash functions.

Target	Rounds	Time	Memory	Type	Reference
<b>Grøstl</b> -256 hash function	3/10	$2^{64}$	-	collision	[9]
	4/10	$2^{64}$	$2^{64}$	collision	[9]
<b>Grøstl</b> -512 hash function	4/14	$2^{64}$	$2^{64}$	collision	[9]
	5/14	$2^{176}$	$2^{64}$	collision	[9]

Table 2: Summary of rebound analysis for the round-reduced **Grøstl** compression function. Semi-free-start collision is a collision in the compression function of the form  $(h, m), (h, m^*)$ , where  $m \neq m^*$ .

Target	Rounds	Time	Memory	Type	Reference
<b>Grøstl</b> -256 compression function	5/10	$2^{64}$	$2^{64}$	semi-free-start collision	[16]
	6/10	$2^{64}$	$2^{64}$	semi-free-start collision	[14]
	7/10	$2^{120}$	$2^{64}$	semi-free-start collision	[9]
<b>Grøstl</b> -512 compression function	6/14	$2^{96}$	$2^{64}$	semi-free-start collision	[9]
	7/14	$2^{152}$	$2^{64}$	semi-free-start collision	[9]

## 2.2 Kelsey’s observations

Kelsey [11] noted that without truncation, the **Grøstl** hash function does not protect against length extension attacks, and he argues that the “ $P(x) \oplus x$ ” part of the output transformation therefore accomplishes little security. In the following, as well as in Section 3.1, we argue why the “ $P(x) \oplus x$ ” part in the output transformation still serves an important purpose.

If the output of the last iteration of the compression function is merely truncated to form the output of the hash function, then Wagner’s generalized birthday attack [20] on the compression function would extend to the hash function, and it would have a complexity of  $2^{n/3}$  since it can be applied to the truncated ( $n$ -bit) hash value. With the “ $P(x) \oplus x$ ” part, Wagner’s generalized birthday attack has to be applied on an internal  $\ell$ -bit value, and since  $\ell \geq 2n$ , the attack has complexity above the birthday attack on the hash function.

## 2.3 Consideration of recent attacks on AES

Recently, a number of surprisingly effective cryptanalytic results on AES-256 and AES-192 have been published [2–4]. These results exploit non-ideal properties of the AES-256 and AES-192 key schedules. **Grøstl** has no key schedule, and therefore the attacks are of no relevance to **Grøstl**. In fact, **Grøstl** was designed to be permutation based to allow for simple analysis, and to entirely avoid attacks mounted on the key schedule. When a hash function is based on a block cipher, such attacks are often difficult to mount, but also difficult to exclude.

## 3 Alternative descriptions of **Grøstl**

Alternative descriptions of a function serve several purposes. They potentially bring greater insights into its security, and may also lead to more efficient implementations. In the standard description of **Grøstl**, the hash function iterates a permutation-based compression function, and then applies an output transformation to form the final hash of a message. However, as we shall see in this section, there are other ways of describing **Grøstl**.

### 3.1 The output transformation as a compression function call

The output transformation is defined as  $\omega(x) = \text{trunc}_n(P(x) \oplus x)$ . Notice that  $\omega(x) = \text{trunc}_n(f(x, 0^\ell) \oplus Q(0^\ell))$ . Hence, if  $H$  is the **Grøstl** hash function,  $\tilde{H}$  is **Grøstl** without the output transformation and  $M$  is the already padded message, then  $H(M) = \text{trunc}_n(\tilde{H}(M \parallel 0^\ell) \oplus Q(0^\ell))$ , which is also illustrated by Figure 1. Since the XOR with  $Q(0^\ell)$  has no cryptographic significance, we may ignore it and consider the description  $\text{trunc}_n(\tilde{H}(M \parallel 0^\ell))$ . The suffix  $0^\ell$  can be seen as an additional padding block.




Figure 1: An alternative description of the **Grøstl** hash function.

This description more clearly shows the validity of John Kelsey’s observation on the output transformation. What precludes an attack based on this observation is the truncation from  $\ell$  to  $n$  bits. Since at least  $n$  bits are dropped in this truncation, the probability of correctly guessing those bits is about  $2^{-n}$ . The alternative description can also be seen as an indication that **Grøstl** is in fact an instance of the chop-MD construction, which prevents extension attacks [5].

Some implementations of **Grøstl** might benefit from this alternative description. It shows that one does not have to specifically implement an output transformation function; the compression function can be used instead. Although this is not likely to improve the speed of implementations, it might reduce code size or area.

Finally, the alternative description shows that the “ $P(x) \oplus x$ ” part of the output transformation does not have unexpected negative side effects. Hence, it does not lead to attacks that would not be possible with mere truncation. Since, as mentioned in Section 2.2, mere truncation leads to attacks that are not possible with the true definition of the **Grøstl** output transformation, we can conclude that the “ $P(x) \oplus x$ ” part strictly improves the security of the hash function.

### 3.2 Tessaro’s observation

Similar to the above description of **Grøstl**, Stefano Tessaro [19] observed that  $H(M) = \text{trunc}_n(\hat{H}(M \parallel Q^{-1}(0^\ell)) \oplus Q^{-1}(0^\ell))$ , where  $\hat{H}$  is the MDP iteration [10] of **Grøstl**’s compression function, with permutation  $\pi(x) = x \oplus Q^{-1}(0^\ell)$ .

### 3.3 Barreto’s observation

Paulo Barreto observed [1] that the **Grøstl** compression function can be seen as an Even-Mansour cipher [7] in Davies-Meyer mode, which is defined as  $f(h, m) = E_m(h) \oplus h$  for a block cipher  $E$  keyed via  $m$ . In the case of **Grøstl**, the block cipher is defined as  $E_k(x) = P(k \oplus x) \oplus Q(k)$ , where  $Q$  can be seen as a key schedule. In other words, the key is XORed with the plaintext (pre-whitening), the resulting value is permuted, and the output is XORed with a permuted version of the key (post-whitening).

## 4 Conclusion

A good amount of analysis has been carried out on **Grøstl** since its submission to the SHA-3 competition. Most of this analysis was done by the design team, and this analysis was initiated before

the submission. Some improvements to the analysis have been made since then, but these have for the most part consisted in finding ways of exploiting more available degrees of freedom. As a result, the best current attacks on round-reduced `Grøstl` leave only few remaining degrees of freedom for the attacker.

External (as well as internal) analysis has provided alternative descriptions of the `Grøstl` hash function and the `Grøstl` compression function. Such alternative descriptions might provide new insights into the security of the hash function (e.g., new security proofs) and improved implementations in some settings.

Finally, we acknowledge John Kelsey’s observations on the role of  $P(x) \oplus x$  in the output transformation, but we point out that the output transformation serves other important purposes than merely protection against length extension attacks.

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